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Abstract and Keywords
The emergence of this handbook on social justice represents a groundbreaking event in
the history of social psychology. In this summary discussion, I outline significant limits to
social justice work embedded in the empiricist tradition of inquiry and point to ways in
which the current work transcends these limits. However, I also view the present endeav
ors as in a fledgling state. In the service of enriching and rendering these pursuits more
effective, I discuss five domains in which tensions currently prevail and suggest direc
tions for future undertakings. Challenges are discussed in terms of epistemological
schisms, presumed ontologies, value pluralism, explanatory paradigms, and the limits of
representationalism. A final invitation is made to shift from a mirroring orientation to re
search to world-making.
Keywords: epistemology, ethics, pluralism, representationalism, social construction, social psychology, pragmatics

The arrival of the Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice into the world
of social psychology represents a mammoth shift in the conception of the science and its
potential offerings to society. My attempt in what follows is both to reflect on this impor
tant venture and to deliberate on its emergent potentials. At the outset, it is important to
understand the historical context from which the present volume has emerged and why
the important topic of social justice has had such scant attention. For the past 50 years
social psychology has been dominated by a singular philosophy of knowledge. It is a phi
losophy of the early 20th century, long abandoned by much of the intellectual world, but
nevertheless sustaining its grip on the field. This philosophy, typically indexed as logical
empiricism (or post-positivism), places a premium on establishing evidence-based princi
ples of human functioning. These principles, it is reasoned, should enable science to pre
dict patterns of human behavior, and thus to provide the grounds for effective practices
and policy-making. The emphasis on prediction and control is typically tied to a mechanis
tic or causal explanatory orientation, and thus to experimentation as the preferred mode
of investigation. This view of knowledge continues to provide the marching orders for
most social psychological research.
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Yet while attractive in its optimism, this orientation to knowledge has failed to provide
useful predictions about human activity outside the laboratory. This is not at all to fault
the motives or values of the research community. As noted by Hammack (2018), the field
has generally been associated with political liberalism. Rather, three of its philosophical
legacies almost ensure its irrelevance to pressing issues of the times. The first of these
legacies is furnished by the logical empiricist emphasis on establishing general laws or
principles. Most research aims at testing a general hypothesis about human behavior. Us
ing a problematic statistical logic, researchers strive to establish the universal validity of
the propositions under test. Yet even for the most (p. 442) “validated” principle, there is
no means of deriving predictions relevant to a particular case. This is not a problem of in
sufficiently elaborated theory—that is, theory encompassing a greater number of vari
ables, situations, or populations. Rather, it is a linguistic problem. General propositions
do not contain within themselves a definitional structure that enables one to specify the
particulars to which they apply. A theory of prejudice, for example, does not in itself spec
ify what counts as prejudice. Nor do attempts at closer specification clarify the matter.
Thus, to say that prejudice is “preconceived judgment” (as only one such definition) does
not in itself tell us what activities or actions count as such. Are we speaking here of one’s
choice of newspapers, ice cream, or marriage partners? And if it is to someone of “anoth
er race,” does it mean when they are eating breakfast, helping their neighbors, or gazing
at the sunset? Any such applications to specific situations will always depend on negotiat
ed agreements among interlocutors, and there are no principled limits over the outcome
of such negotiations. The discourse of prejudice, for example, is free floating within our
public conversations and may with skill be applied (or not) to virtually any behavior.
The second impeding legacy is closely related to the first. If the aim of social psychology
is to generate empirically grounded theories of human behavior, a primary emphasis is
placed on research methods, and particularly to rigorous methods, with tight controls
over possible biases and with measures that are both reliable and valid. Further, because
the aim of such theories is to predict human behavior, experimentation is viewed as the
methodology sine qua non. No other methodology, it is reasoned, can demonstrate cause
and effect sequences, which is to say, the capability of predicting from a specified cause
(independent variable) to a specified effect (dependent variable). Over the decades, the
results of this commitment have virtually changed the face of mainstream social psycholo
gy. Because the field has grown in numbers, and there is increasing competition for jour
nal space, methodological rigor has become a major winnowing device. Demanded are in
creasingly large samples, greater controls, more fully validated measures, multiple repli
cations, and greater statistical sophistication. Increasingly, the practice of research has
become a matter of technical expertise, with researchers functioning as mechanics link
ing method to subject matter to grind out fortifications for abstract propositions.
This increasing demand for rigorous methods—“methodolatry” as critics put it—virtually
disables any attempt to speak cogently to issues of social justice. At the outset, the de
mand for controlled experimentation typically requires that research takes place in the
confines of a laboratory. The artificiality of the conditions means that one can never study
naturally occurring cases of injustice; conclusions of laboratory research can speak to
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such issues only by analogy. The samples available to most laboratory researchers,
housed as they are in predominantly white, upper middle class institutions, make any
generalizations additionally tenuous. Further, issues of social justice are fraught with
moral consequence, which place such issues beyond the reach of the ethical require
ments for laboratory research. For example, oppressing, angering, or commanding labo
ratory subjects would be proscribed. And of major significance, the naturally occurring
phenomena that capture the interest of social justice researchers are typically of high
complexity. As the contributors to the present volume attest, matters of history, politics,
economy, and institutional structure—among others—may all play a part in matters of so
cial justice. Reducing this complexity to experimental studies, where not more than three
variables may interact at any given time, renders it impossible to draw conclusions of any
particular utility to communities or nations confronted with challenges of social injustice.
There is a third legacy that leads to the general incapacity of traditional social psychology
to make more than a tangential contribution to social issues. It is essentially the aim of
the field to illuminate individual mental process. The problems here are two-fold. If the
propositions that social psychologists hope to establish are about the nature of mental
functioning (e.g., cognition, emotion, motivation), then issues of broad social significance
will be marginalized. Whether matters of injustice, environmental degradation, or health
care, for example, all are simply domains to which the results of such formulations may
be applied. They are not the focus of research in itself. One may properly study the cogni
tive basis of racism, for example, but the study of ongoing racist policies will escape at
tention. As often argued, the study of the basic process can provide the grounds for wide
spread application. However, as we have just seen, there is no means of deducing from
the abstract formulation the particulars essential for effective action. Further, such fo
cused inquiry will not generally be pursued because it is “applied research.” In the
(p. 443)

positivist tradition, application is inferior to the “pure research” focus on general

laws.
The problem with the concerted focus on psychological process is coupled with a second,
namely the assumption of the individual as the fundamental unit of society. To the extent
that we conceptualize the social world in terms of atomistic units, and it is the function
ing of the units that is focal, then relations among the units are both marginalized and
problematized. They are marginalized because the relations are secondary to the concern
with the units themselves. They are problematized because it is impossible to conceptual
ize a social process in itself—that is, as anything more than the interaction between oth
erwise separate entities. One may conceptualize A acting in his or her best interests upon
B, and B’s responding in his or her bests interests by acting upon A, (essentially the view
of behavior exchange theorists). But there is no quintessentially social process, with its
structure, functions, patterns, and so on. Many social psychologists have long lamented
the loss of “the social” in social psychology.1
It is in this light that the contents of the present Handbook stand in bold and exciting con
trast to tradition. The first and most important step is that the contributors take as their
starting point the very societal issues they wish to treat. The concern with social justice is
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not derivative of some more general theory or of off-stage mental processes. Issues of so
cial justice are not “applications,” but are worthy of exploration in themselves. This start
ing point also enables the authors to make reference to psychological process without
such processes overshadowing the subject matter of importance. At the same time, in the
process of inquiry the palette of possible contingencies opens wide. For example, con
tained within these chapters are concerns with history, economics, political dynamics,
class conflicts, power dynamics, colonization, and globalization. One would be hard
pressed to locate discussions of such issues in any major journal in social psychology. Fur
ther, the contributors to this handbook have largely abandoned the romance with “truth
through method” in general and the experimental method in particular. Issues of rigor
take second place to their major investment in social change. This is not to say that evi
dence does not play an important role in these chapters. However, for most of these au
thors evidence is typically woven into a rich tapestry of deliberation—on theory, history,
contemporary social conditions, and more. As I see it, a social psychology of social justice
is not an attempt to establish the final word, drowning out all voices by the misleading
“weight of the evidence,” but an attempt to enter cogently and passionately into the dia
logues of the times.
I, for one, am enormously excited by the potentials of this emerging venture in social psy
chology. It furnishes an escape from the cave of irrelevance in which the field has largely
resided. I admire the work of these chapters as robust attempts to chart a new course. It
is in the interest of enriching and strengthening this effort to which the remainder of this
chapter is devoted. Specifically, I wish to pose a range of difficult questions about the pit
falls and potentials of the present trajectory. Significant tensions wend their way through
these pages, some crippling in their potential. Still other questions will be of the kind lev
eled against the movement by more traditional social psychologists. Finally, there are
horizons of possibility contained within these chapters that demand more concerted at
tention. I do not intend to answer all questions, resolve all tensions, or chart the course
for future work. My major aim is to press the dialogue forward in useful ways. In what fol
lows I will consider, then, five significant challenges toward enriching the potentials of a
social psychology of social justice.

Epistemology: Beyond the Crossroads
Why should we place our trust in any particular account of the world, whether it be an ac
count of atoms or oppression? The answer to such a question typically makes reference to
epistemological assumptions, or assumptions about how we know. Across the social sci
ences there are three major contenders for epistemic authority. Two have deep roots in
Western culture; the third is a more recent and cosmopolitan addition. Each of these ori
entations has important implications for our forms of inquiry, the relationship between
the scientist and those under study, the place of values in research, and the confidence
placed in one’s reality posits. Debate among these positions has been heated, often form
ing lines of demarcation among scientific enclaves. How are psychologists engaged in so
cial justice research to orient themselves in this respect? In my reading of the preceding
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chapters of this handbook, we find allegiances to all three. As one might conclude, just
beneath the surface of this seeming unity in concerns are major differences in the con
cept of knowledge and its acquisition. Let us explore.
At the outset, we have the traditional empiricist epistemology that has dominated social
psychology for almost a century. From an epistemological (p. 444) standpoint, one as
sumes a fundamental dichotomy between the observer and the world to be observed. By
employing tools of controlled observation and systematic logic, one may ultimately estab
lish descriptions and explanations that provide an accurate picture or map of the world as
it is. While not necessarily embracing the full array of epistemic assumptions, many of the
chapters in the present volume rely on empirical data, including standardized measures
and statistical analysis, to support their various arguments and proposals. And while
many authors do not openly embrace the tenets of empiricist epistemology, their accounts
of the world are unapologetically realist. At the same time, other chapters display a
hermeneutic/interpretivist orientation to epistemology. The assumption that knowledge of
human action is grounded in observation is challenged on the grounds that action can on
ly be understood in terms of the actor’s subjective condition (intention, meaning, experi
ence). Thus, whatever is said about an actor’s behavior must be grounded in an interpre
tive or hermeneutic process. Contributions to this volume by Frost (2018) and Cross
(2018) are illustrative. The differences between these two longstanding orientations is
significant, not simply in terms of assumptions, but also in matters of methodology and
ethical responsibility.
Yet there is a third epistemology orientation at play throughout the volume, one that may
properly be viewed as social constructionist. Here it is proposed that all accounts of the
world are born within communities of interlocutors. One’s participation in the community
will furnish the assumptions that guide one’s inquiry as well as the discursive conventions
for description and explanation. Thus, there is no grounding of one’s knowledge claims
outside the particular conventions of one’s community of practice. This orientation has
been especially useful to social justice scholars, as it provides an important basis for the
critical stance espoused in Hammack’s (2018) opening essay, along with chapters by
Langdridge (2018) and Fine (2018). In each of these cases attention is drawn to the ideo
logical investments of otherwise neutral, and empirically supported, accounts of the
world.
Since its beginnings in the late 19th century, struggles over epistemology have had a divi
sive effect on the field. Especially contentious has been the battle between positivists, as
represented by early experimentalists, and interpretivists, as initially fueled by Dilthey’s
(1894) emphasis on Verstehen (roughly, the empathic understanding of the subject’s expe
rience). With the 20th century emergence of logical positivism, the interpretive orienta
tion was delegitimized as an orientation to research, but with sustained allegiance in hu
manistic and therapeutic circles. Even today, the fault line remains in the separation be
tween members of the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Association for
Psychological Science (APS). With the post-foundational and postmodern turns in the late
20th century, foundational philosophy of science became widespread. And it is within this
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context that a social view of science, indexed as social constructionism (constructivism),
became a compelling alternative to logical positivism.2 In my view, a constructionist orien
tation enables one to escape the internecine conflict between empiricists and interpre
tivists. If we can understand these orientations as emerging within particular communi
ties, for particular purposes and with particular values, we abandon the fight over funda
mentals in favor of an epistemic pluralism. That is, we may ask about what may be accom
plished (or not), and in what circumstances, by adopting these orientations. In many con
ditions, an empiricist realism may carry significant political weight. Without systematic
observation and empirical data, neither the Asch (1956) nor the Milgram (1963) classics
would carry any social or political significance. In other conditions, the voices of suffering
may be more commanding. The power of various witnessing projects rests on just such
narratives. Those who draw from a constructionist perspective might, in turn, be drawn
to the history, economics, or politics serving to legitimize a discourse of exclusion. Con
cerns with the origins of “race” as a social category are illustrative. And by implication,
invited into the arena of study may be other epistemological positions—feminist stand
point, phenomenological, and practice-based among them.

Ontology: Social Justice in Question
Ontological questions follow closely on the heels of epistemological battles. Perhaps the
most central issue in this case is the ontological status of social justice itself. How can we
legitimate the concept of social justice; how can we identify when and where there is in
justice? Each of the three epistemologies just discussed offers an answer to such ques
tions, and these answers are radically different in implication. For the traditional empiri
cist, justice and injustice are simply facts of social life—out there in the world, open to ob
servation, subject to progressively better understanding through systematic (p. 445) re
search. From the standpoint of a hermeneutic or interpretive perspective, we arrive at a
far different place. Justice and injustice are not there in the world of observation, but they
are constituted within the individual’s subjectivity. Thus we shift our concerns from social
justice in itself to the experiences or subjectivities of those involved. The shift is a signifi
cant one, as theorists point out that systemic injustice can go unseen, while nonetheless
having deleterious effects on the experiences and lives of its victims.
For scholars with a constructionist sensibility, social justice is not a fact in the world but a
way of constructing or appropriating a given configuration. As Opotow (2018) discusses,
even social justice scholars themselves do not agree on conceptions of injustice. More un
settling, and speaking metaphorically, if we use the lens injustice, we will potentially find
it in our every action. Without such a lens, there is no injustice. It also follows that we suf
fer from injustice when we construct the world in such a way that we are its victims.
What may be experienced as “unfair treatment” by one could be constituted as a “ tough
life” for another. This proposal has never been a happy one for those committed to social
justice. It appears to deconstruct the very grounds for resistance and social change. Al
though it is difficult to escape the constructionist logic, it can be viewed as morally repre
hensible in its consequences. However, this critique is short-sighted. First, to point out
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the culturally and historically situated condition of our constructions of justice and injus
tice does not rob them of consequence. On the contrary, there is no true or grounded ac
count of reality against which they can be compared. There is no authority that can de
clare—without question—that “all is well.” For this, too, is a constructed world, and with
out the means of declaring a counter-narrative untrue or invalid. In effect, to recognize
the constructed character of our accounts of the world is to open a space for multiple
voices.
There is more: to declare that injustice is an unalloyed fact is also an invitation to con
flict. Such declarations suggest that there is someone or some group that is acting unjust
ly. It is to make claim to a moral high ground, from which the unjust may be held account
able—possibly shamed and punished. It is to invite resistance, antagonism, and retalia
tion against an “evil other.” Those designated as unjust in this scenario are simultaneous
ly thrust into a position of defensiveness—alienated, defensive, and possibly galvanized in
their resistance. In contrast to the consequences of this realist orientation, to understand
that one’s sense of injustice is one way of constructing a given condition—fully justified
within a given enclave or tradition—is also to realize the possibility of other perspectives
that may contain their own inherent justifications. Hutardo’s (2018) discussion of Border
lands theory is illuminating in this context. Rather than creating a relationship of us ver
sus them, it is to open the possibility of dialogue. It is to invite curiosity, mutual under
standing, and possible collaboration in building a more mutually viable world.

Ethical Value: The Potentials of Pluralism
The present volume stands in stark contrast to virtually all other handbooks in social psy
chology in the primacy of passion exhibited by so many of the authors. Traditional hand
books are virtually lifeless in their accounts of the world, with value commitments either
secreted into the subtext or absent altogether. In the present volume, a passionate com
mitment to social justice is pervasive across the span of chapters. Such an orientation
poses a major challenge to the field of social psychology. As earlier proposed, the tradi
tional assumptions undergirding the field have rendered most of its research irrelevant to
most of the major issues confronting society. Yet while inviting social and political en
gagement, such passionate engagement comes at a cost. On the one side is the question
of whether such research is too political. For example, in the chapters of this volume we
find scholars unabashedly confronting racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, coloniza
tion, liberalism, neo-liberalism, individualism, and more. Clearly such accounts are “ideo
logically loaded.” As such, they risk losing the rhetorical power of “speaking objectively.”
To put it another way, for the uncommitted reader they are propaganda masking as sci
ence. This is not a small problem. For example, members of the US Congress already
question the liberal biases in most social research, distrusting their conclusions, and de
bating the legitimacy of their applications for governmental funding.
At the same time, as we have come to realize (Hammack, 2018), all research is value sat
urated in its inception and its potential consequences. For example, even the most neu
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tral study of the brain basis of mathematical reasoning leaps from the safety of “is” to
bear torches of “ought” into society. Among other things such research implicitly champi
ons the value of predicting and controlling human behavior, potentially enhances the pow
er of those in a position to control, sustains an individualist ideology, and eliminates “free
will” as a discursive tool in the pursuit of moral responsibility. (p. 446) Enlightenment re
garding the values inherent in research of any kind—both in the social and natural sci
ences—should not only be central in the agenda of a social psychology of social justice,
but of a liberal education more generally.
Given that all theory and research is value saturated, the invitation for the scholar is to
choose those projects that best express their passions. Yet such a posture also yields a
new dilemma: reader response bias. That is, the ideological biases of the reader will de
termine whether the inquiry is compelling or not. If the message is liberal, even the most
rigorously performed research, accompanied by the most sophisticated statistics, will
seem propagandistic to the committed conservative. Is this to say that social justice in
quiry, as represented by most of the chapters in this volume, will only speak cogently to
those already committed to their agenda? Herein lies a challenging question for the fu
ture: our forms of scientific writing not only communicate ideas and information; they al
so form relations with our readers (Gergen, 2012). As proposed earlier, there is a strong
sense in which social justice writing can demonize those who, by implication, are respon
sible for the injustice. In effect, the very form of exposition may function to distance itself
from those whose cooperation is most needed in the pursuit of social change.
In effect, we here confront the dilemma of competing values. Social justice research is
more transparent than most in its value commitments. But let us recognize that while
such researchers generally support equality, democracy, socialized economy, human free
dom, and the like, there are also traditions that support equity over equality, a firmly or
dered society, free market competition, and a society united in its religious commitment.
Further, even when committed to the values of social justice, one is simultaneously invest
ed in other values that—in terms of daily life—are often in conflict. Even social justice re
searchers must decide how much of their time they will allocate to such work as opposed
to the well-being of families, friends, the environment, their personal health, and so on.
Perhaps the most important question here, however, is how to approach those enclaves
whose values run counter to social justice investments. It’s not that such groups—such as
neo-liberals—are against justice so much as that the values and policies they espouse con
tribute so directly to what we take to be injustice. Indeed, neo-liberals and other targets
of critique may argue that their primary interests are in human well-being—even if their
conception of well-being and the means for its achievement are injurious in other ways.
As ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre (1988) cogently asks, “whose justice, which rationalities”
should prevail? In certain respects we reach a condition similar to the preceding discus
sion of ontology. A realist orientation to ontology is similar to a foundationalist view of
values. Firm declarations of what is or is not just are equivalent to commitments to a giv
en moral or ethical position: both will serve to divide and alienate. Both will favor condi
tions for what may ultimately become mutual annihilation. There is good reason, then, for
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a social psychology of social justice to embrace a value pluralism. This is not an “anything
goes” orientation that might suggest that all values are equal. Rather, it is to recognize
that one’s value preferences issue from a given tradition at a particular point in history
and are situated within a particular circumstance. That they have no other foundations
than their social lodgment does not delegitimize them. Rather, it is this very lodgment
from which they gain their credibility. However, a value pluralism does invite greater
modesty in terms of one’s claims and simultaneously lays the grounds for more dialogical
ly based means of dealing with inevitable conflicts.

Explanatory Fulcrum: Paradigms and Pragmat
ics
As noted earlier, the present volume is unique in social psychology in its expansive sensi
tivities to conditions, processes and events outside the dominant focus on mental process.
Thus, we find frequent recourse in these pages to discussions of economics, history, poli
tics, social structure, and more. This is indeed a formidable mixture and substantially en
riches the range of discussions in which social psychologists should properly be involved.
However, there are also significant challenges in expanding the arena of understanding in
this way. Perhaps the central problem in this case has to do with the explanatory fulcrum
of understanding. Given what we take to be acts of injustice, how are they to be ex
plained? The central problem has long been endemic to social psychology, as the field has
variously shifted between situation (“bottom up” environmentalist) and person centered
(“top down” hereditary) explanations. Cultural explanations are typically incorporated in
to one or both of these orientations, with brain-based explanations falling into the personcentered camp. This problem in competing explanatory bases is inflated in the present
volume. To be sure, some contributors to this volume (p. 447) do rely on psychological ex
planations (for example, Durheim & Dixon, 2018; Cohrs & O’Dwyer, 2018). At the same
time, other social justice psychologists focus on micro-social explanations, including rela
tional practices of exclusion (Walker & Smith, 2018) and dialogue (Maoz, 2018). Still oth
ers place far more stress on macro-social processes and structures, including history
(Langhout & Fernandez, 2018), social structure (Stewart & Zucker, 2018), the legal sys
tem (Tileagă, 2018), social class (Bullock & Reppond, 2018), colonization (Hutardo,
2018), and globalization (Bhatia, 2018). Interestingly, while traditional social psychology
has abandoned voluntarist explanations—with their anti-scientific echoes of free will—sig
nificant remnants of voluntarism remain within the social justice arena. In this volume,
Liu and Pratto (2018) are clear in their commitment to a conception of individual agency.
One may also say that agency lies implicit in all accounts of injustice, as all are implicitly
intended to incite action. The goal is social change. Such provocations necessarily rest on
the assumption that individuals are free to abandon their conventions and do otherwise.
How then is the researcher to select among these explanatory orientations? None can be
rendered superior in terms of evidence, as the explanatory orientations themselves deter
mine what counts as evidence. Most important, we also confront the dilemma that once
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we select an explanatory discourse, it will in principle eliminate all contending forms of
explanation. An explanatory discourse essentially establishes an ontology, and once that
ontology is embraced within an enclave of researchers, its competitors tend to be (1) ren
dered irrelevant and removed from view, (2) deemed problematic and delegitimized, or
(3) offered as candidates for reductionism. In the first instance, for example, to view psy
chological process as central to human action potentially removes sociological explana
tions from interest. “Social structure is not our concern; that’s what sociologists study.”
To illustrate the case of destroying existence, for micro-social theorists, psychological
process is not a fact in the world. One theorizes the use of psychological discourse in so
cial relations, but to treat such discourse as referential—indexing actual mental states—
would be misleading objectification. And in the third case, once committed to a given on
tology of explanation, other ontologies are subject to reductionism. This is indeed a major
challenge within contemporary psychology as psychological processes are increasingly
shown to be “nothing but” neurological activity. This is the challenge of eliminative mate
rialism (Ramsey, 2016). Similarly, for many psychologists, there is no social structure, in
fact; what we call social structure is the result of mental construal, a cognitive or inter
pretive construction.
To recognize that a choice in the form of explanation can eliminate or reduce all compet
ing ontologies also speaks to a related problem in the social psychology of social justice:
relating the individual to macro-social entities or processes. There is frequent and laud
able concern within the pages of this handbook with the relationship of the individual to
social institutions, economic systems, the culture, and so on. Often a causal relationship
is posited, with the institutions, economic structures, or societal processes affecting the
behavior of the individual. Yet as I am suggesting, these attempts at inclusion are deeply
problematic. We have available multiple vocabularies for explaining injustice, but the vo
cabularies are self-contained and totalizing. Consider, for example, an attempt to show
how socio-economic status (SES) influences the individual’s prejudices. The attempt
seems reasonable enough: we should be able to demonstrate a causal connection be
tween SES and individual behavior. Such a demonstration depends, however, on estab
lishing the independence of the two units. Yet if we were to remove from the table every
one occupying the class structure, there would be no individuals upon which the struc
ture could have an effect. Likewise, to remove all the individuals, there would be nothing
left over to call a class structure. In effect, we have a single “observational world,” as we
may call it, and two descriptive vocabularies. We come to mistake the vocabularies for ac
tual entities, and unwittingly proceed to study their causal relations. The same may be
said for all attempts to posit causal relations between macro units (economic, governmen
tal, cultural, and so on) and the individual’s mental states or behavior. It is this very prob
lem of non-independence that enables one to reduce the former to the latter.
How, then, are we to proceed in the further development of a social psychology of social
justice? In understanding the world in terms of mental process, we will eliminate the rich
repository of scholarship on which dialogues about social justice are given life. The field
becomes isolated. If we eliminate psychological explanation, then a specifically “social
psychology of social justice” escapes intelligibility. In my view the answer to this issue lies
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in the appreciative recognition of multiple, non-competing frameworks or perspectives.
With each (p. 448) framework—whether psychological, interpersonal, inter-group, or
macro social—we come to understand the world in different ways. And with each illumi
nation, new paths of action are suggested. Again we encounter the challenge of plural
ism. We may ask in each case about the pragmatic value or outcomes of various alterna
tives, and remain flexible within a context of shifting circumstance. I am proposing, then,
that we replace the search for Truth with a reflective pragmatism (Gergen, 2015). We
cease to ask whether any account, description, or analysis of what is the case is “true in
all worlds.” Rather, we inquire into what difference such accounts make to our lives, to
our practices, to the culture in which we live, and to the world more generally should we
accept and sustain them. Such an inquiry is clearly value laden, as we must be prepared
to inquire into who gains and losses as a result of a particular account; whose voices are
silenced; and who is advantaged and in what ways.

The Challenges of Representationalism
Fields of endeavor such as the present handbook do not arrive de novo on the intellectual
scene. As many of the contributors to this work point out, there is inspiration to be drawn
from early pioneers in social psychology. At the same time one must be circumspect about
this legacy, as it also contains elements that may be inimical to the goal of social justice.
Indeed, critical psychologists in the present volume are keen to point out a range of divi
sive and oppressive assumptions and practices that characterize much of social
psychology’s history. It is in this light that attention should be drawn to the forms of in
quiry currently playing a central role in social justice work. My chief concern in this case
is the pervasive reliance on a representationalist tradition regarding the relationship of
word and world. In spite of the critical, interpretivist, and constructionist ideas that per
vade the social justice literature, research is primarily employed as a means of represent
ing the world—of illuminating, demonstrating, providing evidence for, showing, indicat
ing, and so on. In effect, the aim of research is to provide a configuration of words that
picture, map, or otherwise mirror the world as it is. It is in this context that attention
must be drawn to a range of issues critical to the future of social justice psychology:

Rights to Representation
For scholars and scientists, the representationalist tradition has largely functioned as a
means of securing voice—that is, enabling the researcher to claim authority over the
“mere opinions” or “subjective” views of the masses. In the special case of social justice
research, this tradition places the researcher in the precarious position of “speaking for
others”—the oppressed, marginalized, dispossessed, and so on. As the history of feminist
inquiry has demonstrated, such authority claims are not only subject to the critique of
those who are represented but may also be viewed as yet another form of silencing. White
feminist scholars were thus placed under attack from Black feminists (“What right do you
have to speak for us?”); nor were Black feminists permitted to speak for women victims of
colonialist subjugation. It is the question confronted on many college campuses as to
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whether “straight” scholars should be hired to teach in queer studies programs. It is also
the rationale behind the cry of those whom the scholarly professions label as “disabled”:
“Nothing about us without us.” When extended to its logical extreme, such a logic would
suggest that no one should have the right to represent anyone except oneself. It is just
such thinking that underlies much autoethnography (Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 2013). Such a
conclusion would indeed be unfortunate. However, exploration is needed into means of
abandoning the rhetoric of authority in scientific representations and/or including multi
ple voices in research undertakings.

Representations for Whom?
Reliance on a rhetoric of authority also determines in large degree the audience for scien
tific representations. Under current conditions this audience is primarily constituted by
scholars and researchers. As a critic might surmise, academic research on social justice
is largely written for a limited network of like-minded academics. Worse still, it is pub
lished in journals that are largely unavailable to the world at large. Indeed, like the chap
ters of this handbook, the present offering is subject to such criticism. It is not simply
that this rhetorical tradition is “elitist,” but it cannot be absorbed by the very populations
for whom it is designed to serve. In this light, movements to make all research available
on open-source providers are to be welcomed. However, if work on social justice is to
reach its full potential, means must be found for communicating to a multi-cultural, pub
lic audience. It is here that social justice researchers would be advantaged by developing
closer relationships with arts-based researchers.3 Film, theater, photography, painting,
and multi-media are all in active play, and all have been used as means of bringing atten
tion to issues (p. 449) of social injustice. Arts-based media might well be added to the cur
ricula for politically engaged social psychologists.

Truth in Representation
Perhaps the most wisely shared critique of the representationalist tradition draws from
linguistic philosophy, literary theory, and social constructionist dialogues.4 The critical
point in question is the relationship between the world and words (or any other form of
representation). Whatever exists makes no demands on how it is described. Thus, while
words may seem to function as mirrors of the world, they do so only by virtue of commu
nities of agreement. Regardless of what is observed, to say that “the cat is on the mat,” is
no more or less true than describing the same observation by saying “God is in his heav
en.” The validity of the former wholly rests on whether we agree in how the terms are
used in the given circumstance. In effect, this line of argument undermines the validity of
any account of the world, save for those who agree to the way in which the language is
employed. Regardless of its rigor, research cannot provide culture-=free and value-free
findings. As a result, claims to Truth may thus be viewed as duplicitous and oppressive;
they treat one’s position as true regardless of anyone’s opinion or values—in short, as a
God’s eye pronouncement. The implications of this line of argument have had a marked
effect in anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and other corners of the social sci
ences. They have yet to be digested in psychology. Future researchers would benefit
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greatly from exploring the various ways in which these companionate disciplines have
been able to “speak their truths” while simultaneously subverting their authority.

Means of Representation
The continuing debates on the assets and liabilities of various research methods often
center on the justification of authority claims. For example, are one’s methods sufficiently
rigorous and unbiased, is the evidence valid and reliable, is the sample size sufficient to
warrant generalization, and so on. As we have seen from the preceding discussion, such
criteria are themselves subject to question. They are essentially byproducts of one,
among many, ways of viewing knowledge. However, one significant criterion—typically
overlooked but central to issues of social justice—is the ideological and political weight
carried by research methods themselves. Methodological practices are not ideologically
neutral. They are forms of life, carrying assumptions about what is good, important, prop
er, or desirable in cultural life. In the case of experimental methods, for example, one
adds credibility to an individualist and mechanistic world view, in which the social world
is presumed to be made up of isolated, robotic entities. In eschewing the presumption of
voluntary action, the very grounds for political action are thrown into question. Narrative
research, in contrast, typically lends credibility—and often honor—to individual experi
ence. At the same time, however, the researcher again suggests a world in which we are
fundamentally separated, each residing in a private interior. It is here that social justice
researchers might wish to employ research methods that add weight to their ideological
or political visions for the future. For example, in this context many researchers turn to
collaborative research practices, with the explicit aim of replacing the hierarchical rela
tionship between scientist and subject with communal participation.5

Horizons of Research: From Mirror to WorldMaking
One of the major reasons for the success of the natural sciences lies in their capacity to
bring about changes in our worlds of practice. Such sciences have cured disease, har
nessed energies, controlled pestilences, and taken humans to the moon. Although the dis
course that such sciences have employed in their pursuits may be found in the libraries of
the world, these discursive configurations were neither the aim of the sciences nor the
reason for their significance. Or, one might say, the discourse was simply their local
means of communicating about what they were doing and why, while the true knowledge
was constituted within the process from which actionable outcomes emerged. In my view,
a social psychology of social justice is enormously important for the field because it be
gins to reverse the emphasis from discourse to actionable outcomes. Researchers begin
with concrete and complex issues in society with the goal of social transformation. As so
many of the chapters in this volume suggest, by means of transforming our understand
ing, liberating us from the taken-for-granted, demonstrating daily injustices, giving voice
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to the marginalized, and actively transforming community life, the directions are promis
ing indeed.
At the same time, as I have pointed out, research is still largely representational, with
publication in journals and books serving as the ultimate outcome. In my view, if the field
is to become truly (p. 450) consequential, a shift will be required from research that
metaphorically mirrors the world to inquiry that actively achieves social change (Gergen,
2015). I fear that the deliberations of isolated academic enclaves do little to change the
world. To be sure, the kind of critical work represented in this volume can arouse resis
tance to the status quo among interested readers. Yet remaining, however, is the question
of mobilizing for action. More directly consequential are active interventions into cultural
life. The most obvious form of such inquiry at present is represented in participatory ac
tion research (Bradbury, 2015). Illustrative is Bhatia’s work with the Friends of Shelter
Associates to facilitate sanitation among impoverished Indian communities, Fine and
Torre’s (2006) attempts to help women in prison gain their rights, and Hammack’s (2011)
work with Israeli and Palestinian youth to reach mutual understanding. Here the end
point of inquiry is not “words on a page” but social change itself. At the same time,
future=forming inquiry should also include the development of social practices contribut
ing to a just society. For example, in this volume, Nagda, Gurin, and Rodríguez (2018)
outline practices for social justice dialogue in educational systems. Inspiration may also
be drawn from the practice of appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), along
with practices developed by the Public Conversations Project (Herzig & Chasin, 2005),
which are both used effectively around the globe for replacing hostility with constructive
dialogue. Finally, social justice psychologists can play an active role in the courts. Herek’s
(2018) contribution to this handbook is illustrative. In all cases, scholars move into the
world as active agents of change. Herein lies a central challenge for the future of social
justice psychology.
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Notes:
(1) For an extended account of the social dimension in social psychology’s history, see
Gergen (2012).
(2) For more complete accounts of social constructionist epistemology see Gergen (1994,
2015a).
(3) See, for example, Barone & Eisner (2012).
(4) For further discussion see Gergen (1994).
(5) See, for example, Lykes (1989).
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